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DEFENSIVE DEFENSE IN FINLAND - WILL IT WORK?

By

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

PULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

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— GENERAL AIR FORCE BASE, ALASKA

April 1994

DEFENSIVE DEFENSE IN FINLAND - WILL IT WORK?

An analysis of Finland's security policy in the past present and future.

The small Nordic states, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, have built their defenses based on national capacities to deter war in the region and to withstand an attack on the respective nations' territories. Norway and Denmark belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and expect allied reinforcements in the event of war or as part of crisis management. Sweden and Finland are neutral nations. The individual countries cannot expect to win a war against a large, resourceful nation in the long run. They have to rely on the way they promote political stability in the region, the capacity of their defenses to deter any attack, or, should deterrence fail, the capacity to withstand an enemy until a negotiated peace can be settled.

Finland's geographical position is such that the nation has been a buffer between the two alliances NATO and the Warsaw Pact (WP) throughout the Cold War period. The nation has gradually built a defense that has been successful as a deterrence. In the post Cold War era, this defense is not longer sufficient to deny the use of Finnish territory for an attacker. This statement is based on the recent developments in technology. Finland has to redefine the role of its defense forces. This is particularly true as Finland has successfully completed negotiating an agreement to join the

European Union. Pending the results of a referendum in late fall 1994, Finland may join already in 1995. If so, Finland can hardly be considered a neutral nation anymore and will have to find new ways for its security policies. The defensive defense of a neutral state may no longer be the desired solution in a new security policy context.

The Republic of Finland is a small, prosperous state in the northern part of Europe. Socially and politically the country is part of the community of Nordic States, which also includes Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Sweden. Culturally and ethnically, however, Finland is different from these countries, with a unique language and a unique cultural heritage. Finland has only been independent since 1917. From the Middle Ages to 1808 the country was part of the Kingdom of Sweden, leading to the establishment of a Swedish speaking community. In the Swedish - Russian war of 1808 - 1809, Finland was conquered by the Tsar, and became an Autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire. With the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, Finland broke free, and on December 6, 1917, Finland's Declaration of Independence was signed by the Senate'.

Finland gained its independence as a byproduct of the 1917 revolution. A bloody civil war followed between the Whites and the Red. Without significant Soviet intervention, and with some support from Germany, the White Forces won this war. During the 1920s and 1930s Finland saw itself as the outpost of Western civilisation and made no secret about its

preparedness to fight its eastern neighbor'. The Winter War (1939 - 1940) is an event that defines Finland's history more than any other event in the nation's history. The nation, divided in two by the gory civil war of 1918, was reunited in opposition to the Soviet Union. Even the Finnish communists did not hesitate to fight the aggressor. As a result of the war Stalin was forced to disband the Kuusinen puppet government he had set up and accept a negotiated peace with Finland'.

In 1941 Finland again was at war with the Soviet Union. When the Germans attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, the Soviet government saw Finland as a dangerous bridgehead and initiated limited military operations. The Finns saw an opportunity to regain territories lost under the Winter War, counterattacked and pushed the demarcation line deep into Soviet territory. This war, which the Finns call the Continuation War, lasted until 1944. Finland eventually lost the regained terrain, but escaped Soviet occupation by the signing of the Armistice in September 1944. "At the heart of Finland's survival lay Finland's determined defence, which prevented the Soviet Union from achieving a complete victory with the forces available in the northern theatre."

The span of three-and-a-half years from the signing of the Armistice to the conclusion of the Finno-Soviet Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Treaty (FCMA) in April 1948 was marked in Finland by an uncertainty over the future of the

republic. This time of anxiety was designated "the years of danger" (Vaaran vuodet) by the Finnish historian Lauri Hyvämäki in the title of a book in 1954.¹ During most of this period, the country was supervised by an Allied control commission which consisted of both Soviet and British representatives, but where the main supervisory role was overtaken by the Soviet representatives. The Commission stayed in Finland until the signing of the Peace Treaty in September 1947. In addition, the Finnish Communist Party managed, through the first post-war elections in March 1945, to win six seats in the government. The position of Minister of Interior was particularly influential as he, Yrjö Leino, controlled the regular police as well as the State Police. The Finns' fear of Soviet occupation increased with the introduction of Soviet troops into Porkkala naval base, located only 20 kilometers west of Helsinki.

Understandably, the Finnish policy makers recognized the dangers and adopted a very cautious and careful policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. As Urho Kekkonen, later president in Finland expressed it in 1943: "The proximity of a great power to us, or our proximity to it, whichever way it is expressed, is something we can never change." he elaborated in 1957: "The vital issue for the Finnish people has always been the relationship with the eastern neighbour, irrespective of whether its name has been Novgorod, Muscovy, Russia or the Soviet Union." During these "years of danger" and since, Finland's security-political situation can be characterized by

four relatively immutable facts of life. Firstly, the immediate proximity to the Soviet Union, and now Russia. Finland's border with Russia extends over 1,269 kilometers and is only 150 km from St. Petersburg. Proximity in itself may not imply significance, but the subjective potential for conflict was considerable during the Cold War. This was basically due to the second fact-of-life; the previous ideological differences between Finland and the USSR and a legacy of mistrust based on historical experience. Thirdly, the imbalance in power between the superpower the Soviet Union, and even now Russia, and a small nation of approx 5 mill inhabitants. Finally, Finland is militarily isolated. Finland's experiences after independence and during both wars have been that effective outside support or alliance partners to rectify the Fenno-Soviet imbalance have not been within the realms of possibility.

On this basis, Finland's policy towards the Soviet Union/Russia has been two-pronged. It has been a policy of reassurance and a policy of deterrence. The Finnish leadership, immediately after the war, voluntarily guaranteed the Soviet/Russian security interests affecting Finland, thereby removing the primary Soviet motivation for occupying the country. This shift in Finland's stance was carried out by J. K. Paasikivi, the chief negotiator of the armistice with the Soviet Union in 1944, and Finland's president between 1946 and 1956. It was formally embodied in the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of 1948.

Through the treaty, Paasikivi essentially removed the main possible justification for Soviet control over Finland. Finland was reduced from a "need to have" objective to a "nice to have". The task for the Finnish leaders became to ensure that the "need to have" objective never arose again, and secondly to ensure that there would never be any opportunity for the distinguished neighbor to satisfy its "nice to have" interest at a low cost. Thus, to ensure that Finland's military deterrent remained credible against the levels of pressure secondary interests could justify, also became a political goal for the Finnish leadership.

Some knowledge of contents and the background for the FCMA treaty is important to fully understand Finnish security policy and the emphasis on a non-provocative foreign policy over the last 50 years. In a letter to Paasikivi 22 February 1948, Stalin proposed that Finland and the Soviet Union began negotiating a treaty of friendship that would be based on the treaties the USSR had with Rumania and Hungary. President Paasikivi confessed privately that he saw the note as being aimed at the inclusion of Finland in the Soviet Union's military sphere of influence as well as the institution of a communist government in Finland. The Finnish government prepared a complete counter-proposal to Stalin's suggestions, emphasizing that Finland could not accept an identical or even similar treaty to the Soviet-Romanian or Soviet-Hungarian treaties. The principle of reciprocity and the automatic mechanism for initiating military co-operation could not be

extended to the Finnish treaty. In-addition, peacetime co-operation between the Finnish and the Soviet armies could not be accepted. To the surprise of the Finnish delegation to the negotiations, Molotov accepted the Finnish proposal as a basis. The only major point of contention had to do with the question of the initiation of the military co-operation. The final text was settled in a compromise. The final Finnish-Soviet treaty differed substantially from the treaties which the USSR had concluded with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and Hungary. While these treaties recognized no territorial limitations on the application, the Finno-Soviet treaty applied only in case of an attack through Finnish territory. There were no provisions that could require Finnish troops to leave Finnish soil in any circumstances. There was no automatic mechanism that would bring Finland and the Soviet Union into military co-operation - the parties would negotiate on the proper response. The treaty was not based on the concept of joint defensive action. Instead it stipulated that the Soviet Union would provide assistance 'only if necessary.'

The Finnish interpretation of the treaty has been remarkably liberal. Already Paasikivi claimed that the treaty did not in any way change Finland's foreign relations or duties. In addition he claimed, disregarding the text of the treaty, that in order for consultations to begin, the threat of an attack must be mutually established. The Soviet Union was not vocal about the differences between Finnish and Soviet interpretations. The most important thing for the Soviet

officials seems to have been that a treaty had been signed without excessive international attention.

The FCMA treaty has existed, with small alterations, up to the demise of the Soviet Union in 1992. All this time it has had a significant impact on both Finnish foreign policy as well as defence policy. Although the treaty did not stop Finland from becoming a full member in the Nordic council, it was not before the 1980s that the lack of Soviet interest resulted in conspicuous changes in Finnish political life. The conservative Coalition Party (Kokoomus), which had been kept out of the government for twenty-one years due to Soviet disapproval of its policies, won the election of 1987 and formed a new government with the social democrats. Finland became a full member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1983, and a member of the Council of Europe in 1989. It began to co-operate in high technology with the European Space Organisation and EUREKA. The Soviet Union let all this happen without a hint of disapproval. The FCMA treaty and the Paris Peace Treaty have not stopped Finland from building up a relatively strong military defense force either, as a deterrent against any aggressor.

However, the FCMA treaty has governed Finland's defence, security and foreign policy after the war. It has been important for Finland to ensure that the Soviet Union did not perceive a military threat via Finnish territory. Such a perception would be a function of two factors: The Soviet

(now Russia) perception of a military threat in the Nordic area and the credibility of Finland's capacity to shield the Soviet Union from that threat. There is little Finland can do to influence international political and military developments affecting the Russian threat perception affecting Finland's territory. The purpose of one element of Finland's "active foreign policy" has, however, been trying to assist in reducing tensions in the European region in general and minimize their spill-over to the Nordic region. The second variable, involving the capacity of the defense forces to shield Russia from a perceived threat via Finland, has been the key field of Finland's reassurance policy. For a nation to remain neutral, it is important that it can demonstrate the will to safeguard its territory so no threat can be perceived by neighboring countries through its territory. Furthermore, the country must demonstrate a capability to safeguard the territory. To demonstrate will, Finland must provide both formal guarantees and informal, psychological guarantees, which affect both foreign and domestic policy. To demonstrate capability, Finland must have a military capability guaranteeing that the country can prevent foreign transit of its territory. This is the task of the Defence Forces.

Finland has adopted a concept of Total Defence. This is an attempt to adopt a comprehensive security posture which combines military forces with a fairly well-developed Civil Defense structure and an attempt to link the civilian economy and political infrastructure explicitly in defense planning.

Finland has also adopted an operational doctrine of territorial defense which sees the protection of national territory as the chief security task for the armed forces and Civil Defense as protecting the civilian population.¹ The term Total Defense was adopted in Sweden already in the early 1950s in order to connote the all-encompassing nature of defense preparations in the era of total war. In Austria the term "comprehensive national defence" was adopted in the 1960s in order to avoid the negative connotations of the term "total" (such as totalitarian and total war). In Finland, the term Total Defence was replaced in 1964 with "security policy" for the same reasons. Since then, it has become an established pattern in Finland to divide security policy into foreign policy and defence policy.

Finland's economic preparedness for a war is somewhat limited. Originally very dependent on the forest industry for employment and revenue, since World War II the Finnish economy has become diversified, especially in the fields of machine building, ship construction and metal working. In the period 1944 - 1952, much of the national economic effort was devoted to paying off the war reparations demanded by the Soviet Union. These payments delayed Finland's economic recovery and even threatened to bankrupt the country. Since the successful retirement of this debt, the Finnish economy has been capable of rapid expansion, ensuring a high standard of living and an extensive system of social services,² although lagging some 5 - 10 years behind the economic development in the rest of the

Nordic countries. Economic defense is an extensive sector of national defense, including fields like industry, agricultural production, fuel and power supply, foreign trade, labor as well as transport and construction. The co-ordinating and planning body for the above fields is the Planning Board for Defence Economy under the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

Although Finland, largely as a consequence of the 1973 oil crisis, has attempted to establish a system for stockpiling key resources like human and animal food, fuels and medicine, it is quite obvious that the measures taken are not sufficient. Finland is among the most scarcely populated countries in Europe. Distributed stockpiling of key resources, and especially perishables or resources which have to be cycled through the storage system, e.g. fuel, would indeed be very uneconomical and hardly affordable. The distribution system and the infrastructure of the lines communication have become fairly advanced with the improved economy in Finland over the past decades. This has led to a reduction in local stockpiling, as in the neighboring countries, Norway and Sweden. The local merchants in small communities do not any more store large volumes or quantities of foodstuff et cetera. To counter the tendency of being dependent of import of key supplies from a limited number of countries, Finnish foreign economic policy has been focusing on developing increasingly diverse export markets and diverse sources of supply. Finland does have some capacity to live through a crisis of some duration. About one third of the country's energy requirements can be satisfied by means of

domestic fuels and hydro-electrical power. The amount of liquid fuels in various emergency stocks corresponds to several months of normal consumption. Agricultural production is capable of satisfying nutritional needs during a prolonged period of time. Because of the vulnerability of the lines of communication, Finland can, however, not count on sustaining a war effort over an extended period of time. To some degree, Finland could again be the victim of economical blackmail, similar to what it experienced in 1941, when Germany controlled the Baltic Sea and Norway, the Soviet Union prepared for a new offensive against Finland and Sweden strived to remain neutral. In order to avoid starvation, Finland had to accommodate Germany's wish for the Finnish support of Operation Barbarossa.

The civil defense is specifically aimed at reducing the loss to the civilian population by war or other comparable events. Civil Defense is kept clearly distinct from armed national defense. The Ministry of the Interior has the overall responsibility for the direction of the Civil Defense. At the county administration level, the activities are led by the County Governments and at the local level, by the municipalities. Under the Civil Defense Act, preparations have been made to protect the population in principle throughout the entire country. The Government is responsible for general protective measures, and the municipalities for those required in their respective areas. Shelters of various kinds are ready for use by a little more than two million

persons (of a population of 5 mill). Plans have been made for evacuations with the intention to avoid the effect caused by a conventional arms attack. Very little has been done to avoid the dangers of radioactive fall-out, except for radiation control. Efforts have been made to enable the Civil Defense to warn people of impending danger. The operation of the alarm system is for instance linked with the air surveillance system. The various fire-extinguishing, rescue and first aid units operating in emergency situations, constitutes some 100,000 persons. The total personnel count in the Civil Defense proper is approximately 400,000. If number of personnel engaged in the Defence Information, in maintenance of public order and safety, in maintenance of communications and in the medical services were added, the number would grow substantially. Finland has a fairly advanced civil defense system, although it is quite obvious it has not been constructed to counter the effects of nuclear war. This is probably partly due to misconception of the fifties that nuclear weapons were only a more powerful conventional weapon, partly due to the Finnish belief in president Kekkonen's initiative in the early sixties for a Nordic nuclear free zone and partly due to the stated policy of the nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against any nation not possessing such weapons or in alliance with nations with such weapons.

A particularly important issue in analysing Finland's defense requirements is the question of what are the most likely crises that the country might have to find. What kind of

threats are there, and how likely are they? In particular, are the most probable crises of a manageable size, or are they so overwhelming that Finland could not do much about them anyway? How should the Finnish force structure be, given that the crises are manageable? The widely accepted starting point for military planning in the Nordic region is that the potential threat to the area will most likely originate not inside the region, but as a result of outside crises. A Finnish defense report echoes this conclusion: "Any potential military threat against Finland is likely to be part of a wider international crisis or armed conflict."¹¹ Support for this shared Nordic conclusion is found in the way the surrounding strategic environment is shaped. The main factors affecting the military situation in the High North are elements in the global situation between Russia on the one hand and the United States and its allies on the other. Although they are not specifically addressed to Finland they affect and complicate the defense planning.

On this background, a set of fundamental tasks have been formulated for the Finnish military forces and the elements of civilian defense. These tasks are presumably an integral part of general Finnish foreign policy and are subsumed under several fundamental goals and objectives. The general goals are as follows:

- The preservation of the territorial integrity of Finland in peacetime and in war.
- Denial of Finnish territory to any would-be aggressor

whose purpose may focus on the subjugation of Finland proper or on the utilization of Finnish land, sea or air space for aggression against third parties.

- Preservation of the political, socioeconomic and legal systems of Finland.

In order to execute these fundamental tasks, the defense forces and the political authorities immediately responsible for them, have established a number of more specific functions, the most important of which are the following:

- Maintenance of the forces authorized under existing treaties and proper training of personnel.
- Production, procurement and maintenance of equipment needed by the defense forces.
- Enhancement of the population's support for the defense effort and development of physical education and sports, thereby improving the ability of all Finns to participate in this national effort."

The Finnish perception of the military threat to the nation has been divided in two different schools of thought since the Continuation War. Within the Finnish armed services there emerged two approaches to the post war situation. On the one hand there was the line pursued by Marshal Mannerheim (President from 1944 to 1946) which emphasised co-operation with the Soviet Union and the Control Commission. This approach can be termed the modernist defense policy because it was premised on fundamentally new strategic thinking." While Finland had for centuries fought the Russians with passion,

the modernist view now recognized common military interests with the Soviet Union and therefore considered the Soviet Union as a military partner of Finland in the loose sense of the term. On the other hand, there were officers who felt less certain about Soviet's intentions and who, therefore, continued to prepare counter-measures for the eventuality of a Soviet occupation. This, at that time, secretive defence policy line, can be called the traditionalist line because of its traditional attitude toward's Finland's strategic situation. For its advocates, the Soviet Union was neither a friend nor an ally, but a dangerous potential adversary who might very well attempt to occupy Finland, even following the conclusion of an armistice. Despite the contradictory approaches of the modernists and the traditionalists, a certain overlap existed, already at that time, between the two defence policy lines. The modernists could not totally ignore the possibility of a Soviet occupation. The modernist line became to a certain degree the declared policy for the presidents following Mannerheim as well. Under Paasikivi, president from 1946 to 1956, the tendency was to live by the slogan: "Do not tease the bear." It was generally believed that Paasikivi had succeeded in his attempt to create relations of mutual confidence between Finland and the Soviet Union and that the return of the Porkkala naval base in 1956 was a concrete example of the Soviet trust in Finland's foreign policy. The Finns did not pay attention in public to the overall changes in Soviet foreign policy and military strategy during this period of time. With the lack of

allocation of funds to the Finnish military forces from 1944 to 1956, it is highly unlikely that the poorly funded forces could have suddenly convinced the Soviet Union that the Finns had the capabilities for a sufficient defence of their own. However, the incident led to Paasikivi's first speech about Finland's defence policy since 1948. His unilateral pronouncements in this speech concerning the FCMA treaty cannot be regarded as realistic prescriptions for a possible crisis situation in the Nordic region. They should be regarded as efforts to create an image of Finland as a state whose defence policy was not dictated solely by the relationship with its eastern neighbor. The Soviet withdrawal from Porkkala naval base resulted in a change in Finland's low-profile defence policy. As the prospects for neutrality became more realistic, defense spending was increased modestly and a defense policy with a slightly higher profile was adopted.

The advent of Finnish neutrality coincided with the beginning of Urho Kekkonen's period as president (President from 1956 to 1981). His promotion of neutrality could not, however, take place at the expense of Finland's relations with the Soviet Union. According to a statement by Kekkonen in 1961, "the better we succeed in maintaining the confidence of the Soviet Union in Finland as a peaceful neighbor, the better our opportunities are for a close co-operation with the countries of the Western world."

In Kekkonen's view, foreign policy was a far more important activity than defense policy. Yet, one of Kekkonen's earliest conspicuous measures of international consequence did include the use of Finnish defense forces. In 1956 Kekkonen decided to send troops to Suez as part of the United Nations Emergency Force. This decision was based on a belief that sending peacekeeping forces would be helpful in the promotion of the idea of Finland's active policy of neutrality, a policy that aimed at making a positive contribution to world peace. Since the Suez crisis, Finland has been active as a participant in UN peace keeping activities. Kekkonen's belief that Finland could not defend itself against nuclear arms strengthened his conviction that Finland had to seek security through foreign policy. This meant to some degree the promotion of Finland's neutrality. Following Khruschev's inclusion of Finland in his list of neutral states, Kekkonen began referring to the PCNA treaty as a legal basis for neutrality.

The most serious crisis in Finno-Soviet relations since the 1940s was what later has been referred to as the Note Crisis in 1961. The note, suggesting military consultations between Finland and the Soviet Union, had its background in Soviet reactions to increased NATO influence in the Nordic region and to the poor state of the Finnish defence capabilities in the face of the new strategic situation in the area. The note crisis finally convinced Kekkonen of the need of "a readiness and capability to repel violations of neutrality." In a speech in Kouvala December 28, 1961 he added that the defense

forces supported this policy by their mere existence, but "the more effective they are, the better they can do it."¹¹ The most conspicuous step towards improving Finland's defense posture was the growth in military purchases. Up till now, Finland's defense had been structured largely to counter the traditionalist threat scenario, a surprise attack with land forces by an enemy which sought to improve its strategic situation by occupying Finland. Such an attempt could turn into a prolonged war, for which Finland had to be prepared. (The Soviet Union was never mentioned by name, even if it was quite obvious that no other nation could pose such a threat). Now, the defense capabilities against the modernist threat scenario of a Western aerial or naval attack were improved. Among the major purchases from the Soviet Union were a few MiG-15s, a squadron of the most modern version of MiG-21s and two RIGA-class frigates. The army purchases included long range artillery and a small number of amphibious tanks. In addition, a few dozen Swiss-made Hispano Suiza anti-aircraft cannons were purchased and long-range radar and Vigilante anti-tank missiles from Great Britain.¹²

Kekkonen reverted back to his view that foreign policy was more important than military policy. It was not before 1970 that the defense forces began to receive more funds at a steady rate. Budget allocations were stabilized and long term procurement planning was started. This coincided with ample recognition in the west of Finland as a neutral state, while Soviet began to withdraw its earlier unconditional

recognition of Finland's neutrality. Kekkonen's (and the Social Democratic Party's) acceptance of stronger Finnish military capability grew together with the intensity of Soviet criticism levelled against Finnish neutrality. During the 1970s the Finnish navy and air defenses were again upgraded - this time with Swedish Draken fighters, with AIM-9 missiles, while long term plans for the improvement of the army were agreed upon. The consequences were quite dramatic: expenditure on military procurement increased from 116 mill FIM in 1970 to 1,990 mill FIM in 1988 (in real terms an increase of 250% compared to the GNP).¹⁰ The single domestic factor that made the modest, but steady build-up possible was the setting up of three Parliamentary Defense Committees which left their reports in 1971, 1976 and 1981. These committees defined Finland's foreign policy and the type of neutrality Finland was to pursue, as well as the force structure Finland could afford to pursue its political goals.

The 1980s and early 1990s have in many ways been the culmination of Finland's foreign policy efforts in the post war era. The nation continued to integrate itself into the West. An indication of this is the recent decision to purchase F-18 fighters from the United States of America.¹¹ Its relations with the Soviet Union were deprived of most of the secrecy and dualism in the 80s. Constraints were removed in domestic public debate. The Finnish government declared unilaterally on September 21, 1990 that Finland no longer felt compelled to live by the stipulations of the 1947 Paris Peace

Treaty.'" The FCMA treaty has been canceled in 1992 and replaced with a Friendship Treaty with Russia,'" and Finland may become a member of the European Union.

The Finnish doctrine for defense of the country has developed in parallel with the developments in foreign and defense policy. One of the absolutes has been the stated intention to take advantage of the topography and the climate of the country, which the Finnish people are quite able to do. Like in the other Scandinavian countries, the Finns enjoy outdoor life. They participate to a large degree in orienteering during summertime and cross country skiing during winter, not necessarily as competitive participants, but they enjoy these sports as a way of life. This makes the Finns able to survive in harsh winter conditions, and to use the topography to their benefit. These abilities became obvious advantages during the two wars with the Soviet Union and have been a basis for the further development of military doctrine.

Today's territorial defence system in Finland is the result of a gradual evolution since 1944, based on the lessons learned in the war combined with analyses of the international development of military technology and doctrine. The trend among the planners has been the constant effort to increase the depth, mobility and endurance of military operations. This has been hampered by the limited funds initially available for the defense forces. It was recognized already in the early 1950s that defense in great depth was necessary,

but it was not until the 1970s that the necessary materiel for such operations became available and the territorial defense strategy became feasible. In the period up to 1960 the command structure became decentralized and the brigade became the basic combat formation to provide greater flexibility. The strategy was based on an expanded version of the tactics adopted in the final stages of the Continuation War and was called Defence Positions (defensive lines in a belt some ten km deep). To compensate for the lack of operational mobility, the terrain was exploited as far as possible. It was recognized that defense must be carried out in far greater depth, including active operations with greater offensive aggressiveness. In this context the value of guerilla warfare and independent operations by small units were increasingly emphasized. By the late 1950s the regular training of units for such operations began. During the 1960s limited improvements in the army's fighting equipment permitted a deeper defense strategy, called the Defence Zone. This consisted of two or more successive Defence Positions with a total depth of some 50 km. Within the zone, a smaller force, equipped with the most modern weapons and transport, operated dynamically. In a sense, this system, combining mobile heavy strike forces with a very large number of relatively immobile light infantry, represents the essence of today's operations, though on a much smaller scale with less weapons and using more primitive tactics.

The territorial defense system today is based on the requirements identified by Finland's military strategy which focuses on peacetime readiness, crisis management and national defense. The peacetime readiness task is focusing on policing violations Finland's territory and maintaining readiness against crisis or surprise attack. Crisis management is based on the possibility of an international or regional crisis affecting Finland. For this purpose the Fast Deployment Forces has been developed. This organization consists of up to 250,000 men, including 120,000 from the Air Force, Navy, Frontier Guard and various surveillance and C'I networks, and 130,000 from the Army. It is characterized by rapid mobilization, flexible configuration and sustainability over time. In the event of a full invasion, the National Defence Forces become the most important instrument of security policy. If mobilization has not taken place, the military forces are divided into Covering Forces, which are the rapidly mobilizable forces, consisting of both General Forces and Local Forces, located in strategic areas along the frontier or inside the country. Their task is to cover the full mobilization of the reserve by protecting key centers and delaying an eventual enemy advance into the country. Once the full wartime force has been mobilized, the Defence Forces are divided into General and Local Forces. This division is based on the quality of the troops and their equipment. The General Forces overlap to a large degree with the Fast Deployment Forces. The Local Forces are generally light infantry tasked

with guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines and light infantry and guard duties in their own area."

Finland has been successful in guarding its neutrality and independence since World War II. This can not be contributed to Finland's defense policy alone. It should be quite obvious that the Soviet perception of the Finnish people as stubborn, independent and willing to fight for independence, is part of the reason. But it has to be admitted that the relatively low strategic value of Finland, especially after Soviet gained control over the Baltic states, must be part of the reason why Finland has been left alone. Nevertheless, Finnish resolve and will to fight has influenced and contributed to stability in the northern region, partly due to its deterrent value and partly due to skillful politics of the Finnish leadership. In Norway, as a part of NATO, there has never been any doubt about Finland's will to defend its territory. In periods, however, the capacity to do so has been questioned. Finland has vindicated the accommodations it had to accept after World War II, and has become a nation totally free to make its own, independent choices.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s it became increasingly more obvious that technology had surpassed the type of defenses small nations can afford. The air battles of the 1991 Gulf War is an eloquent example. The technological factor must be defined not simply in terms of military lethality, but also in terms of the complex of economic capacity, industrial know-how

and the competitive frontiers of research and development that produce military technology. The operational characteristics of contemporary conventional military technology are changing the meaning of the geostrategic and geopolitical environment in which it must operate. Finland is one of the countries whose defense doctrine will most likely be affected because the importation and acquisition of high-tech equipment raise foreign policy sensitivities in regard to dependence on other nations." This problem must have been very obvious to the Finnish decision makers when deciding to Purchase the American F-18 fighter. It is also quite obvious that a nation like Finland, with its limited GNP, cannot afford to build a defense which denies low observables like stealth aircraft and cruise missiles, access to Finnish air space. The capability of the Finnish defense to defend Finland's territory against transit of such immense fire power, is becoming increasingly more questionable for its neighbors. It is also obvious that Finland cannot defend itself against air strikes with high precision, conventional weapons, supported electronic warfare, without overspending on its military defense. The ability of a small nation to defend its neutrality has become questionable. Such an evaluation may have been part of the reason why Finland has chosen to apply for membership in the European Union. Within the EU, collective security in a larger context is possible. After Maastricht, the ultimate goal for EU is to create the European Political Union (EPU) which aims to harmonize foreign policy interests of the member nations and to give the community a voice in international

affairs by establishing a common foreign and security policy. This might include the eventual framing of a common defense policy and in time lead to a common defense.

If Finland's security can be guaranteed through EU some time in the future, it seems that its main challenge will be to find a satisfactory political and economic position in tomorrow's Europe. Because of Finland's geographic position in the northernmost corner of Europe, and its wait-and-see tradition, the country may easily find itself lagging behind the major economic and political developments in Europe. But being a late-comer will not be a threat to Finland's security. Caution may indeed be a blessing. But Finland should not forget a saying that has been contributed to Bismarck: Russia is never as strong or as weak as it seems.

Notes:

1. Ries, Tomas: "Cold Will - The Defence of Finland," Brassey's Defence Publishers, London, 1988: p. 1
2. Lukacs, John: "Finland vindicated" Foreign Affairs Vol 71, No 4, 1992, p. 53.
3. Penttilä, Risto E. J.: "Finland's Search for Security through Defence, 1944-89," St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991: p. 3.
4. Ibid.: p. 4
5. Ibid.: p.6
6. Ries, Tomas: "Cold Will," p. 226.
7. Ibid.: p 225.
8. Penttilä, Risto: "Finland's search for Security through Defence," pp. 79 - 32.
9. Ibid: p. 152.
10. Stein, George J. "Total Defense: a Comparative Overview of the Security Policies of Switzerland and Austria", Defense Analysis Vol. 6, No. 1, 1990, p. 17.
11. Penttilä, Risto: "Finland's Search for Security through Defence," p. 89.
12. Gilberg, Trond: "Finland" in Taylor, William J., "Nordic Defense: Comparative Decision Making.", Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company/Lexington, Massachusetts, 1985, pp. 43 - 44.
13. Möttölä, Kari: "Finland's Foreign Policy and Defense in a Changing East-West Security Environment." in Zoppo, Ciro Elliot: "Nordic Security at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century." Greenwood Press, New York, 1992, p 97.
The quotation is a translation from "Report of the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee", Committee Report 1981: 1 (Helsinki, 1981), p. 32. The same basic argument is repeated in "Report of the Parliamentary Defense Commission, Helsinki, April 25, 1986, pp. 6 - 7.
14. Gilberg, Trond: "Finland" in Taylor, William J.: "Nordic Defense: Comparative Decision Making.", Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts, p. 53.
15. Penttilä, Risto: "Finland's Search for Security through Defence, 1944-89.", pp. 9 - 17.
16. Ibid: p. 78.
The quotation is from Kekkonen's speech at the National Press Club in Washington on October 17, 1961.

17. Kekkonen, Urho: "Neutrality, the Finnish position," London, 1970.. pp. 112-113.
18. Penttilä, Risto: "Finland's Search for Security....", pp. 105 - 106.
19. Ibid: p. 113 and p. 192.
20. "F/A-18 wins Finnish DK fighter contract." (News Breaks) Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 11, 1992.
21. Järvenpää, Paul O.: "Technology and Military Doctrine in the Future of Finnish Defense" in Zoppe, Ciro Elliott: "Nordic Security at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century." p. 102.
22. Lukacs, John: "Finland vindicated," Foreign Affairs, Vol 71, No. 4, 1992, p. 52.
23. Ries, Tomas: "Cold Will", pp. 257 - 286 gives a detailed description of the territorial system.
24. Zoppe, Ciro Elliott: "The issues of Nordic Security: The Dynamics of East-West Politics, Emerging Technologies, and Definitions of National Defense" in "Nordic Security at the Turn of The Twenty-First Century." pp. 16 - 17.

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